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The past decade has witnessed unprecedented changes in both the 
caseload size and administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) program. Welfare caseloads increased nationwide 
by about 26 percent from 1990 to the peak in early 1994, and then 
declined by 35 percent as of the third quarter of 1998. With the lone 
exception of Hawaii, every state has experienced caseload reductions, 
ranging from a 13 percent drop in Alaska to an 86 percent drop in Wis 
consin. Two factors are widely credited for these declines: strong eco 
nomic growth and a fundamental transformation of the welfare system 
(Blank 1998; Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Ziliak et al. 1997). 
Since 1993, nearly 18 million new jobs have been created, unemploy 
ment rates have fallen to their lowest level in a generation, and employ 
ers of low-wage workers are arguably facing the tightest labor market 
in 50 years (Maharaj 1998). During this same period, the U.S. Depart 
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) became more liberal in 
granting waivers from federal AFDC requirements, permitting states to 
experiment in earnest with their welfare systems. These experiments 
culminated in the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). PRWORA cre 
ated a new federal block-grant program called Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) to replace AFDC; the new program elimi 
nates individual entitlement to cash assistance and gives states wide 
latitude in setting program parameters.
While it is generally incontrovertible that the business cycle and 
welfare reform underlie the dramatic decline in the AFDC program, the 
relative contribution of each factor is in dispute. While the Council of
17
18 Figlio and Zihak
Economic Advisers (CEA) presents a number of specifications, their 
preferred estimate suggests that the business cycle accounts for 44 per 
cent of the decline in AFDC caseloads from 1993-1996, while welfare 
waivers account for 31 percent of the decline. Alternatively, Ziliak et 
al., using higher-frequency data and a more dynamic specification, 
attribute nearly two-thirds of the decline to the robust economy but 
nearly nothing to welfare reform.
Because the policy implications from the CEA and Ziliak et al. dif 
fer significantly, it is important to delineate the methodological differ 
ences in order to make more informed fiscal and welfare policy. For 
example, if AFDC cases only weakly respond to business-cycle condi 
tions, then we would expect the welfare-program budget surpluses that 
many states have enjoyed recently to persist even into a recessionary 
period. Alternatively, if caseloads are strongly countercyclical, then 
states that have failed to save for a "rainy day" may face difficult fiscal 
constraints during the next cyclical downturn. In addition, any interre 
lationship between welfare reform and the macroeconomy may 
become disentangled when the economy turns toward recession. 
Bishop (1998) presented evidence that most of the increase in labor 
force participation rates since 1994 is among single women with chil 
dren. If a large share of these women are former welfare recipients and 
the recent success of welfare reform is tied to the robust economy, then 
the movement from welfare to work could be much weaker in a slug 
gish economy.
Our purpose here is threefold. First, we conduct an extensive rec 
onciliation between the findings in Ziliak et al. and those of the CEA. U 
Specifically, using the data and sample period employed by the CEA, 
we examine the relative impacts of the business cycle and welfare 
reform on the 1993-1996 caseload decline via numerous modeling 
choices, including using recipients versus cases as the outcome of 
interest, using year dummies versus a cubic trend to control for macro- 
economic factors, using controls for welfare benefits, using weights in 
the regression model, using different sample periods, using first differ 
ences instead of levels, and using a dynamic framework. Second, we 
turn our attention to the issue of how welfare recipiency might respond 
in the event of a recession. To address this question, we employ the 
preferred dynamic specifications that arise from the reconciliation and 
simulate how caseloads respond to alternative "shocks" to the unem-
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ployment rate. Third, we examine the possibility of interactions 
between the macroeconomy and welfare reform.
Our reconciliation suggests that the differences in results between 
Ziliak et al. and the CEA emanate largely from the treatment of 
dynamics. These dynamics surface in the form of sluggish adjustment 
of current caseloads to past caseloads, from lags in the response of 
caseloads to changes in unemployment rates, and from nonstationari- 
ties in caseloads (especially at monthly frequencies). The primary con 
sequence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to reduce the role of 
welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in generating the decline 
in AFDC caseloads. Once we control for dynamics, we attribute up to 
75 percent of the 1993-1996 caseload decline to the macroeconomy 
and at most 1 percent to welfare reform.
Moreover, the simulations underscore both the importance of con 
trolling for dynamics and the cyclical sensitivity of welfare recipiency. 
We find that the implied long-run effect of a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate is 2.5 and 6 times the static estimate 
in levels and first differences, respectively. In addition, we find that a 
2-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads up to an 
11.7 percent increase in welfare recipiency after four years, while a 4- 
percentage-point increase yields a 23.4 percent increase in recipiency. 
Finally, the results from interactions between the macroeconomy and 
welfare reform indicate that pre-TANF welfare reform requires a 
robust economy (i.e., low unemployment rates) in order to have a neg 
ative impact on recipiency rates.
REVIEW OF CASELOAD LITERATURE
Research on modeling aggregate AFDC caseloads is a relatively 
recent addition to the welfare literature. This stands in contrast to the 
large microeconometric literature that focuses either on the determi 
nants of AFDC participation or the duration of welfare spells (Dan- 
ziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981; Moffitt 1992). A few previous 
papers have considered the impact of economic stimuli on caseload 
levels without examining the concurrent effects of welfare reform. 3 
The purpose of most of these studies has been to develop models that
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can accurately forecast changes in the number of families receiving 
AFDC over time. They tend to use time series data and focus on a sin 
gle state, and in some cases on a single city (New York). The study by 
Peskin, Tapogna, and Marcotte (1993) for the Congressional Budget 
Office is a notable exception in their application of quarterly time- 
series data for national AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP (unemployed par 
ents) caseloads.4 They employed a distributed lag model, permitting 
the business cycle to have a dynamic impact on caseloads, and found 
that both Basic and UP caseloads exhibit strong countercyclical move 
ments. Specifically, their model predicts that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the employment gap (the percentage difference between 
potential and actual employment) leads to a 0.5 percent decline in 
Basic and a 1.7 percent decline in UP caseloads in that quarter.
Moffitt (1987) used cross-sectional and time-series data separately 
to study the large run-up in AFDC recipiency in the late 1960s. For the 
cross-sectional analysis, he employed a static model of AFDC partici 
pation for 1967, 1973, and 1979, where participation is a function of 
measured demographics, AFDC program parameters, and the unem 
ployment rate. The model predicts that most of the run-up is unex 
plained by economic and demographic factors. Instead, Moffitt 
attributed the increase to non-economic factors, such as court-ordered 
and legislative decisions that made eligibility easier and an increased 
willingness to participate in the program, possibly due to a reduction in 
the stigma associated with benefit receipt.
More recently, researchers have turned to state-level administrative 
data to model the impact of both the business cycle and welfare reform 
on AFDC caseloads. The advantage of the state panel-data approach is 
that it fosters identification of the business-cycle and welfare-reform 
effects by exploiting spatial differences across states and time-series 
differences within states. Because the focus of this paper is in reconcil 
ing the results from this literature, we provide a more detailed sum 
mary of the methods.
The Council of Economic Advisers (1997) employed annual state- 
level panel data for 1976-1996 to model per capita AFDC recipiency 
rates. The dependent variable combines AFDC recipients, not cases, in 
both the Basic and UP programs; this implicitly assumes that the busi 
ness-cycle and welfare-reform responses between the two groups are 
identical. The CEA modeled per capita recipiency as a function of the
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business cycle, waivers from federal welfare programs, program 
parameters, and unobserved state fixed effects and trends. To capture 
the impact of the business cycle, the CEA used current and one-period- 
lagged state unemployment rates; the lag controls for any delays 
between the timing of unemployment and the receipt of welfare. The 
waiver variables were defined as the fraction of the year that the (full- 
state) waivers are approved. In some specifications the waivers were 
aggregated as "any statewide waiver," while in others they were disag 
gregated as "JOBS sanctions," "time limits," "work requirements," 
"family cap," and "earnings disregards." In several specifications, the 
CEA included both contemporaneous waiver variables and one-period 
"lead" waivers. The latter was an attempt to control for political ratio 
nal expectations on the part of welfare recipients, signifying that wel 
fare benefits were soon to be threatened. The AFDC program 
parameter was the AFDC maximum-benefit guarantee for a family of 
three, which is used to capture the "price" of welfare. Lastly, the state 
fixed effects and trends controlled for permanent differences in labor- 
force composition and welfare populations, as well as trending differ 
ences across states.
In their preferred results (Council of Economic Advisers 1997, 
Table 2, Column 6), the CEA found that contemporary unemployment 
has little effect on AFDC recipiency, but that a 1-percentage-point 
increase in lagged unemployment increases recipiency by almost 5 per 
cent. The waiver effects are mixed—there is no significant current effect 
from the variable "any statewide waiver," but the lead effect suggests 
that states with any anticipated federal waiver could expect a 6 percent 
decline in annual recipiency rates. The conclusions were reversed for 
the "JOBS sanctions" variable: the current effect suggests a 7 percent 
decline, but there is no significant lead effect.
The specifications in Blank (1998) are similar to the CEA's, with a 
few notable exceptions. She used annual state panel data from 1979- 
1995 and estimated separate models for AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP 
caseload levels. In addition to the explanatory variables used by the 
CEA, Blank controlled for a second lag in unemployment, along with 
interstate differences in median and 20th percentile wages, racial com 
position, female headship, age composition, average years of school 
ing, and political affiliation of the governor and state legislature.
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Overall, Blank's estimates of the effects of the business cycle and 
welfare waivers do not differ substantively from the CEA's (see Blank 
1998, Table 2, Column 1). The net effect of a 1-percentage-point 
increase in unemployment leading to a 3.8 percent increase in cases is 
comparable to the CEA's estimate of 4.07 percent. When Blank 
included a lead waiver (Blank 1998, Table 3, column 2) she estimated 
that "any statewide waiver" leads to about an 12.8 percent reduction in 
caseloads; again, this is similar to the CEA's overall estimate of about 
12.5 percent (summing up the current and lead coefficients). It is 
important to note how closely the results mimic each other even though 
Blank's pertain to Basic cases while the CEA's pertain to total recipi 
ents. Blank did find that the UP program is more responsive to macro- 
economic and policy variables than the Basic program; however, since 
UP cases are only about 6 percent of the total, pooling the samples ade 
quately represents the majority of cyclical and welfare-reform move 
ments in cases. Unlike the CEA, Blank did not prefer the models with 
lead waiver variables, because the latter likely capture other factors 
changing in the states (prior to waiver approval) and not true program 
effects.
The paper by Ziliak et al. (1997) differs in several dimensions from 
those of the CEA and Blank. The period under study was shorter 
(1987-1996), the data were monthly as opposed to annual state-level 
data, and the empirical specification was more parsimonious in control 
variables because there is very little within-year variation in measured 
demographics. The dependent variable was per capita AFDC-Total 
caseloads, while the measures of the business cycle were either 
employment per capita or the unemployment rate. The welfare waiver 
dummy variables (1 = month waiver was approved) were broken down 
into four categories: work requirements, time limits, work pays (e.g., 
higher earnings disregard), and responsibility (e.g., family cap). 
Finally, there were controls for state fixed effects and time trends, as 
well as month-of-year dummy variables to control for seasonality in 
caseloads and employment.
Two additional methodological differences in Ziliak et al. are that 
the model was estimated in first differences and it had a richer dynamic 
structure. Ziliak et al. provided evidence that monthly caseloads are 
nonstationary in levels but stationary in first-differences. Moreover, 
they introduced dynamics into the model in the form of state depen-
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dence (6 lags of the dependent variable), lagged business cycles (11 
lags of employment per capita), and an "implementation lag" for the 
welfare waivers. The implementation lag was defined as the number of 
months since approval and was designed to capture the fact that it may 
take several months or even years to revamp the program with the 
reforms in place.
The results and subsequent policy implications of Ziliak et al. dif 
fer markedly from those in the CEA and Blank. Ziliak et al. gave much 
more weight to the business cycle relative to welfare reform in explain 
ing the recent decline. The small overall effect of welfare waivers 
arises because the type of waiver that a state adopts matters for aggre 
gate caseload levels: some are caseload-decreasing while others are 
caseload-enhancing. In simulations of the dynamic model, they 
showed that work requirements and responsibility waivers significantly 
reduce caseloads, yet waivers that make work more attractive increase 
caseloads by nearly the same percentage. Ziliak et al. conducted a lim 
ited reconciliation of their results with those of the CEA and Blank and 
concluded that the key difference arose through the modeling of 
dynamics.
In the following sections, we expand on the reconciliation begun in 
Ziliak et al. One issue that we do not address econometrically is the 
effect of lead waivers. As mentioned above, Blank did not believe that 
the lead variables signal true program effects. Martini and Wiseman 
(1997) went even further in their critique of the CEA's use of lead 
effects, arguing that many of the waivers are not "threatening" per se 
and the one waiver that might be perceived as threatening, "JOBS 
sanctions," has no significant lead effect. Moreover, they claimed that 
it is unlikely that welfare recipients would respond one year in advance 
of waiver approval when the approval date is so uncertain, and that if 
lead effects are to be interpreted literally, then all states without waiv 
ers as of August 1995 should be coded with a lead effect anticipating 
PRWORA. However, the latter would be unreasonable, because pas 
sage of PRWORA was uncertain up to a month before President Clin 
ton signed it into law. Additionally, Ziliak et al. presented evidence 
that lead effects disappear in annual first-difference models. Because 
of these limitations, we do not explore the role of lead waivers further. 
Consequently, our reconciliation focuses on the CEA's specification 2, 
which does not control for lead waiver effects.
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RECONCILING THE CEA AND ZILIAK ET AL.
The data used in this study are the same as those employed by the 
CEA. Although Ziliak et al. used state-level monthly data, for the pur 
poses of the reconciliation it is most instructive to use the same data as 
the CEA in order to abstract from data issues and focus on modeling 
choices. The annual state-level panel data are for the 1976-1996 fed 
eral fiscal years and contain information on AFDC recipients, state 
unemployment rates, state population, real AFDC maximum benefits 
for a family of three, and statewide welfare waivers. In addition to the 
CEA data, we collected information on caseload levels by state and 
year. The reader is referred to the CEA technical report (1997) for 
more extensive details about the data.
We begin our reconciliation by replicating specification 2 from 
Table 2 of the CEA. This static model regresses the log of AFDC 
recipients per capita on the unemployment rate, the real maximum 
AFDC benefit for a family of three, year dummies, and state-specific 
fixed effects and trends. The year dummies control for macroeconomic 
factors that affect all states in a given year, such as federal expansions 
in the Earned Income Tax Credit or oil-price shocks. Meanwhile, the 
controls for time-invariant state fixed effects and for state-specific 
trends are intended to capture not only fixed unobserved state-specific 
propensities to take up welfare, but also slow-moving state-specific 
trends in demographics such as fertility rates, marital status, and 
migration patterns. Thus, the static model for each state z (i = 1, . . . , 
51) in period t(t= 1,..., 21) is
Eq. 1 Rit = |i + aURu + pW,-, + QBU + y, + 8, + V + e«v»
where
Rit = the natural log of per capita AFDC recipients
URit = the unemployment rate
Wit = the welfare reform indicator that equals the fraction of a
year (based on the approval date) that "any statewide
waiver" is in effect
Bit = the real maximum AFDC benefit for a family of three 
jt = a vector of year effects
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8j = the time-invariant state-specific deviation from the overall 
constant ji
\t = the state-specific trend,
£lt = a random error.
To control for possible heteroskedasticity, the regression is weighted 
by state population.
In column 1 of Table 1, we present the base-case, weighted-least- 
squares estimates of the effects of the business cycle and welfare 
reform on per capita AFDC recipients (CEA's specification 2). The 
results suggest that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate will yield a 3.1 percent increase in per capita AFDC recipients. 
Alternatively, states with a statewide welfare waiver experience a 5.5 
percent decline in AFDC recipiency relative to states without a waiver. 5 
The point estimates are useful for decomposing the fraction of the 
1993-1996 decline in recipients attributable to the business cycle and 
to welfare reform. The estimates indicate that the robust economy 
accounted for 31 percent of the decline, while welfare reform 
accounted for 16 percent.
Recipients versus Caseloads
The first step towards reconciling the results from Ziliak et al. with 
those from the CEA involves the choice of dependent variable. Ziliak 
et al. used AFDC caseloads per capita as the dependent variable, rather 
than the number of AFDC recipients. Cases may be preferred to recip 
ients because the latter confounds the number of households receiving 
AFDC with the within-household fertility behavior. In addition, the 
number of cases may better represent the underlying household behav 
ioral response to changes in economic conditions and welfare reform, 
because it is the adult who makes the decision about whether or not to 
participate in AFDC. In most situations, there is only one adult per 
AFDC household, while there may be several children, so the caseload 
correlates most closely with the number of decision makers. Lastly, 
there appears to be more political interest in understanding the factors 
that affect the number of cases than those that determine the number of 
recipients per se. In fact, most welfare reform waivers are designed to 
affect the caseload rather than the number of recipients.
Table 1 Sensitivity of Static Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita AFDC 



























































due to the economy
% of 1993-1996 decline 
due to welfare reform
15.8 157 23.7 14.6 18.3 9.6 4.2 2.6 0.4
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the Dis 
trict of Columbia. Unless noted otherwise, all regressions are based on fiscal years 1976-1996, use total recipients, are weighted by the 
state population, use levels, and have controls for the real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state- 
specific trends, and year dummies.
Col. 6 = Blank (1998) sample period
Col. 7 = Ziliak et al. (1997) sample period
Col. 8 = first differences
Col. 9 = unweighted first differences
b Col. 1 = CEA (1997) specification 2. 
Col. 2 = AFDC caseloads 
Col. 3 = cubic trend 
Col. 4 = no AFDC benefits 
Col. 5 = unweighted
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To test the sensitivity of the model estimates to the choice of 
dependent variable, we report the results from a model of AFDC case 
loads in column 2 of Table 1. The estimates are nearly identical, espe 
cially for the welfare waivers, to those from the model with AFDC 
recipients reported in column 1. This indicates that the differences 
between the CEA and Ziliak et al. are not due to the use of a different 
dependent variable. 6
Year Dummies versus Cubic Trend
The next dimension that differentiates the models of the CEA and 
Ziliak et al. is in the way that they controlled for period-specific macro- 
economic factors that are common to all states. The CEA used annual 
year dummies; Ziliak et al. used a cubic trend because they used 
monthly data, and rather than append 120 month dummies to the 
regression, they parameterized the national trends with a cubic polyno 
mial in order to capture the fall (1987-1990), rise (1990-1993), and 
subsequent fall (1993-1996) in caseloads. It is not clear a priori 
whether the use of a cubic trend is likely to favor the business cycle or 
welfare reform relative to year dummies.
Column 3 reports the sensitivity of the model estimates to the use 
of a cubic trend rather than year dummies. Relative to column 1, it 
appears that the cubic trend imputes less of an effect to the economy 
and considerably more to welfare reform; that is, the fraction of the 
1993-1996 decline attributable to the economy falls to 26 percent and 
the fraction attributable to welfare reform rises to 24 percent. This 
suggests that, if anything, the specification used by Ziliak et al. is likely 
to favor welfare reform relative to the economy. Since Ziliak et al. 
attributed a smaller effect to welfare reform relative to the CEA, it is 
clear that the choice of a cubic trend cannot explain the discrepancy in 
results.
Benefits versus No Benefits
Unlike the studies by the CEA and Blank, Ziliak et al. did not 
include welfare benefit levels as a regressor because of the lack of suit 
able instruments that could deal with the possible simultaneity with 
recipiency. It is sensible to think that while benefit levels might
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explain welfare recipiency, the size of the caseload might also affect 
the benefit level. Indeed, the simultaneity between welfare benefits 
and recipiency has been shown by Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (forthcom 
ing), Gramlich and Laren (1984), and Shroder (1995). Nonetheless, it 
is instructive to examine the sensitivity of the estimated business-cycle 
and welfare-reform effects to the inclusion of welfare benefits, even 
though they may be endogenous.
Column 4 of Table 1 presents a reduced-form version of the base- 
case model in which welfare benefits are omitted. As shown, the esti 
mated welfare-reform and business-cycle effects differ trivially 
whether one includes or omits welfare benefits. Again, this suggests 
that controlling for welfare benefits, even if endogenous but treated as 
if they are exogenous, does not lead to substantive differences between 
Ziliak et al. and the CEA.
Weighted versus Unweighted
Both the CEA and Blank weighted their regression models; the 
CEA used total population and Blank used the population of women 
between the ages of 15 and 45 (under the assumption that the latter are 
more likely at risk for entering AFDC). On the other hand, Ziliak et al. 
did not weight their regression model. In general, weighting a regres 
sion model is recommended in situations of nonrandom sampling, non- 
spherical disturbances, or random parameter heterogeneity (Deaton 
1997, pp. 67-73). Since all 50 states and the District of Columbia are 
represented in the data, they clearly are not subject to problems associ 
ated with nonrandom sample-selection bias. The disturbances may, 
however, be nonspherical, most likely in the form of heteroskedasticity 
(and serial correlation in the absence of controls for caseload dynam 
ics). Nonetheless, it not clear that the only source of heteroskedasticity 
arises from population as assumed in the CEA and Blank. A more 
agnostic approach is to assume that the form of heteroskedasticity is 
unknown and to simply adjust standard errors using the Eicker-Huber- 
White correction.
Martini and Wiseman (1997) criticized the CEA for weighting by 
arguing that if states are viewed as "laboratories" for waiver experi 
ments, then each state should be given equal weight. Indeed, we have 
no a priori reason to believe that a state's population factored into
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HHS's decision-making process for welfare waivers. Martini and 
Wiseman's argument suggests that the impact of waivers is homoge 
neous across states, and if so, then unweighted regression is superior to 
weighted regression on efficiency grounds. If, instead, we expect the 
responses to the experiments to be different across states, then weight 
ing like that of the CEA and Blank produces consistent estimates when 
the parameter heterogeneity is unrelated to the other variables in the 
regression model (i.e., random coefficients). If this is a correct param 
eterization of the unobserved heterogeneity, then the usual weighted- 
least-squares standard errors are incorrect, although this obviously has 
no effect on the parameter estimates (Deaton 1997, p. 73). Indeed, as 
long as the model is correctly specified, there should be no significant 
difference between weighted and unweighted parameter estimates. If, 
however, the model is misspecified (e.g., through a lack of controls for 
caseload, business-cycle, and welfare-reform dynamics), then weighted 
and unweighted parameter estimates may diverge.
In column 5 of Table 1, we report unweighted business-cycle and 
welfare-reform estimates. Weighting by population in column 1 has 
the effect of reducing the estimated impact of both the business cycle 
and welfare waivers. The fraction of the 1993-1996 decline attribut 
able to the economy rises from 31 to 36 percent, while the fraction 
attributable to welfare reform rises from 16 to 18 percent when moving 
from weighted to unweighted regression analysis. The downward 
effect that weighting has on the waiver estimates is most likely due to 
the fact that the larger states had both relatively smaller caseload 
declines and later (or no) pre-TANF waiver approvals. Likewise, these 
larger states also experienced less-pronounced reductions in their 
unemployment rates. Because the share of the caseload decline due to 
the business cycle and welfare reform between the weighted and 
unweighted models differs by about 17 percent, this suggests that the 
static model in Eq. 1 is mispecified. However, because the proportion 
ate increase attributable to the economy and to welfare reform is nearly 
identical, weighting the regression model is not likely the primary 
source of difference between the CEA and Ziliak et al.
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Sample Period
The CEA's estimates were based on federal fiscal years 1976- 
1996, while Blank used 1977-1995 fiscal years and Ziliak et al. used 
1987-1996 fiscal years (although the latter used monthly, not annual, 
data). Because many states did not receive a welfare waiver until 1995 
or 1996, it is possible that ending the sample in 1995 (as Blank did) 
would lead to a lower welfare-reform estimate. However, her esti 
mated business-cycle effect should be quite comparable to that of the 
CEA because both samples include the dramatic contraction and sub 
sequent expansion of the 1980s. The sample used in Ziliak et al., on 
the other hand, included the entire pre-TANF waiver period (like the 
CEA) but misses the substantial cyclical movements of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. This suggests that Ziliak et al. and the CEA should 
have comparable welfare-reform estimates, but that the Ziliak et al. 
business-cycle effect may be either dampened or strengthened relative 
to the CEA, depending on the relative changes in caseloads associated 
with economic fluctuations. 7
Columns 6 and 7 in Table 1 present business-cycle and welfare- 
reform estimates for the sample periods used by Blank and Ziliak et al., 
respectively. In general, the results confirm prior expectations, espe 
cially with regard to the 1977-1995 sample used by Blank. The frac 
tion of the decline attributable to the economy using Blank's sample 
period is about 30 percent, compared with the 31 percent in the base 
model (Column 1). Alternatively, the fraction due to welfare reform is 
a much lower 9.6 percent due to the termination of the sample at the 
same time that many states were still in the process of receiving waiver 
approvals. The results in column 7 based on the Ziliak et al. sample, 
however, are somewhat perverse, in that a negative 9.7 percent share is 
attributed to the economy and only a 4.2 percent share to welfare 
reform. In annual data, we expect the Ziliak et al. sample may yield a 
smaller share to the economy than the CEA, but not a negative share. 8
The differences in the point estimates in columns 1 and 7 seem too 
pronounced to be explained simply by different aggregate macroeco- 
nomic conditions between 1976 and 1987. Indeed, further analysis 
indicates that the differences (at least for the welfare waivers) are 
explained to a large extent by three states: Florida, Iowa, and Michi 
gan. Eliminating those three states yields welfare waiver coefficients
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of-1.69 for the CEA sample period and -2.22 for the Ziliak et al. sam 
ple period. However, the coefficient on unemployment remains nega 
tive in the Ziliak et al. sample. What is special about Florida, Iowa, 
and Michigan that by eliminating them from the sample makes the 
welfare-waiver effects comparable across sample periods? From 
1987-1992, these three states saw a 19 percent increase in the case 
load, while the rest of the country saw a slightly larger increase of 22 
percent. However, from 1976-1987, the two sets were much different: 
the three states saw an increase of 11 percent when the rest of the coun 
try saw a reduction of 7 percent. As a result, from 1976-1992, these 
three states saw an increase of 30 percent while the rest of the country 
saw an increase of 15 percent. From 1992-1996, the three states saw a 
decline of 16 percent while the rest of the country saw a decline of 12 
percent. Put differently, Florida, Iowa, and Michigan saw a bigger 
deviation from trend in the welfare-reform years than did the rest of the 
country. This suggests that the sample period matters in the annual 
static model, but it is not clear whether the CEA's period is preferable 
to the Ziliak et al. period, because the differences in welfare-reform 
estimates are driven by a few states.
Levels versus First Differences
The CEA model in Eq. 1 above is estimated in levels; however, Zil 
iak et al. estimated their model in first differences. It is important to 
note that asymptotically fixed effects and first differences should pro 
vide the same point estimates as long as the model is well specified. 
The two estimators could diverge if there is measurement error in the 
regressors or if there are misspecified dynamics either in the form of a 
nonstationarity in caseloads or in state dependence. Ziliak et al. pre 
sented evidence that nonstationarity in AFDC caseloads is likely to be 
a problem, especially at the monthly level but also in annual data; 
indeed, formal augmented Dickey-Fuller tests cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 percent level. In many panel-data 
applications, nonstationarity is less problematic because the asymptot- 
ics are based on the cross-sectional dimension (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen 1988, p. 1373). However, in the CEA and Ziliak et 
al. papers, the cross-sectional dimension was only 51, which is sub 
stantially less than "large" as typically implied in panel-data asymptot-
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ics, and thus suggests that nonstationarity cannot be dismissed out of 
hand.
Columns 8 and 9 in Table 1 present weighted and unweighted 
first-difference estimates, respectively. Both specifications yield sub 
stantially lower point estimates relative to the levels models. The 
fraction of the 1993-1996 decline attributable to the economy falls to 
10 (14) percent, while the fraction attributable to welfare reform falls 
to a meager 2.6 (0.4) percent in the weighted (unweighted) model. 
Because of the substantial difference in parameter estimates, this sug 
gests that the static model in Eq. 1 suffers from some form of mis- 
specification, whether it be nonstationarity, lack of controls for state 
dependence, measurement error, or some combination of the three. 
Ziliak et al. argued that the difference is due to nonstationarity and 
state dependence in caseloads; however, they did not address the pos 
sibility of measurement error. It may be the case that measurement 
error in state unemployment rates is exacerbated in the monthly data 
relative to annual and in first-differences relative to fixed effects as 
noted by Griliches and Hausman (1986). If that is the case, then Zil 
iak et al. should be biasing their estimates of the effect of the macro- 
economy toward zero relative to the CEA by estimating the first- 
difference model with monthly data. This bias, however, is in the 
opposite direction to that argued by those who believe the Ziliak et al. 
model is somehow biased toward the macroeconomy. We do not for 
mally address the issue of measurement error here, but instead pro 
ceed with the maintained assumption in CEA, Blank, and Ziliak et al., 
i.e., that unemployment rates are not measured with error.
Static versus Dynamic Specifications
We now extend the static model in Eq. 1 to allow a detailed param 
eterization of dynamics. As shown in Ziliak et al., these dynamics are 
manifest both in the form of state dependence in caseloads and in 
lagged responses to cyclical movements in the economy. Specifically, 
even after controlling for heterogeneity in the form of state-specific 
fixed effects and trends, previous AFDC recipiency may have a direct 
impact on future recipiency, i.e., recipiency may sluggishly adjust to 
changing economic and political conditions. In addition, we expect 
lagged unemployment to be important as well because welfare recipi-
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ents are likely to be the last ones hired during an economic recovery 
and thus may not instantaneously move from welfare to work.
We consider two variants of the dynamic model, one in levels and 
the other in first differences. The dynamic levels estimating equation is
S J
Eq.2 Rlt = |I+ X P sRlt -s + I (
5=1 7=0
and the dynamic first-difference estimating equation is 
Eq.3 A*,, = Xp5A*I,_,+ l
s=\ 7 = 0
where all variables are defined as in Eq. 1 and where yt in Eq. 3 is a re- 
normalized vector of year effects. Notice that in Eq. 2 and 3 the lag 
lengths for recipiency and the unemployment rate are not restricted to 
be the same. One can approach the issue of lag length either by start 
ing broadly and then eliminating lags to improve model fit or by start 
ing with a short lag structure and adding additional lags. We use the 
latter approach, in conjunction with the Schwarz criterion, and find that 
four lags of recipiency rates and unemployment rates provides the best 
model fit.
In Table 2 we present the estimates of the dynamic models for a 
variety of specifications, including levels and first differences, weighted 
and unweighted, and the Ziliak et al. sample period. Column 1 presents 
weighted estimates of Eq. 2, which is the dynamic analogue to the 
weighted static CEA model in Table 1 . The estimates reveal a strong 
degree of state dependence and lagged responses to changes in the 
unemployment rate. Important here is the change in the fractions of the 
decline attributable to the macroeconomy and to welfare reform in the 
dynamic context: we now attribute about 48 percent of the decline to 
the economy and -6.7 percent to welfare reform. The negative impact 
of welfare reform follows from the positive coefficient on "any waiver." 
A positive coefficient on welfare reform is not implausible if one con 
siders that the variable "any waiver" is an aggregate of all waiver types,
Table 2 Sensitivity of Dynamic Estimates of the Impact of Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita 






















































































































































































% of 1993-1996 decline 47.5 56.4 18.3 30.5 68.9 75.5 22.9 30.7
due to the economy
% of 1993-1996 decline -6.7 1.1 -4.2 -2.8 -3.1 -2.5 -5.6 -5.7
due to welfare reform
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia. Unless noted otherwise, all regressions are based on fiscal years 1976-1996, use total recipients, are weighted by the state 
population, are in levels, and have controls for the real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state- 
specific trends, and year dummies.
b Col. 1 = base case Col. 5 = base case 
Col. 2 = unweighted Col. 6 = unweighted 
Col. 3 = Zihak et al. sample period Col. 7 = Ziliak et al. sample period 
Col. 4 = unweighted + Ziliak et al. sample period Col. 8 = unweighted + Ziliak et al. sample period
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and a positive effect simply implies that the weighted impact of case 
load-increasing waivers (e.g., higher earnings disregards and asset lim 
its) dominates caseload-decreasing waivers. Ziliak et al., in their 
dynamic model of monthly data, disaggregated waiver types into work 
requirements, time limits, work incentives, and responsibility waivers 
and also permitted lag effects of waivers, yet still found that, for the 
nation as a whole, the economy accounts for 66 percent of the 1993- 
1996 decline and welfare reform for -9 percent. This suggests that the 
results in Table 2 are not an artifact of the aggregated "any waiver" 
specification. Consequently, controlling for dynamics in welfare recip 
iency enhances the role of the economy and reduces the role of welfare 
reform in accounting for the decline in welfare utilization between 1993 
and 1996.
We also reconsider several of the model specifications reported in 
Table 1; in particular, in the static model we found that there are differ 
ences depending on whether one weights the regression. In column 2 
(Table 2) we report the results from the unweighted analogue to col 
umn 1. As in the static model, the contributions of both the macro- 
economy and welfare reform increase relative to the weighted model, 
although the share attributable to welfare reform is effectively zero. 
We also noted that the results are sensitive to sample period. Hence, in 
columns 3 and 4, we present weighted and unweighted parameter esti 
mates from the Ziliak et al. sample period. While the welfare reform 
effects are quite comparable (columns 3 and 4 relative to columns 1 
and 2), the share of the decline attributable to the economy falls sub 
stantially.9 This result underscores the potential pitfall of using a rela 
tively short time horizon to identify business-cycle effects. Again, 
however, it is important to emphasize that this criticism does not apply 
directly to the Ziliak et al. paper, as they used 120 months rather than 
10 years.
Lastly, we address the issue of levels versus first differences in col 
umns 5 to 8. Recall that dynamics might arise not only from state 
dependence and lagged responses to unemployment rates, but also 
through nonstationarity. Columns 5 and 6 indicate that first differences 
increase the fraction of the decline attributable to the robust economy a 
further 45 percent over the col. 1 weighted model (to 69 percent) and 
by 34 percent over the col. 2 unweighted model (to 76 percent). Inter 
estingly, though, the first-difference specifications do little to the wel-
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fare reform estimates. Consequently, while the dynamic first- 
difference specification enables the model to identify a larger role for 
the macroeconomy relative to a dynamic levels model, this is not 
accomplished at the expense of welfare reform, but instead from other 
previously unobserved factors in the model (such as state-specific 
trends). 10
In summary, we conclude from our reconciliation that the majority 
of the difference in model estimates between the CEA and Ziliak et al. 
arises from the treatment of dynamics. These dynamics surface in the 
form of nonstationarities in caseloads, sluggish adjustment of current 
caseloads to past caseloads, and lags in the response of caseloads to 
changes in unemployment rates. First-differencing to eliminate a pos 
sible nonstationarity permits the dynamic model to attribute a larger 
role to the macroeconomy relative to a static or dynamic levels model. 
However, after differencing the dynamic model, weighting the regres 
sion no longer has a substantive impact on the parameter estimates. 
The primary consequence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to 
reduce the role of welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in 
accounting for the decline in AFDC recipiency. Our preferred model 
specification indicates that the macroeconomy accounted for three- 
quarters of the 1993-1996 decline in welfare recipients, while welfare 
reform had a negligible impact.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO RECIPIENCY RATES IN THE 
NEXT RECESSION?
A key issue confronting policymakers is how welfare caseloads 
might respond in the event of a recession. If AFDC cases only respond 
weakly to business-cycle conditions, then we would expect the wel 
fare-program budget surpluses that many states have enjoyed recently 
to persist even into a recessionary period. Alternatively, if caseloads 
are strongly countercyclical, then states who have failed to save for a 
"rainy day" may face difficult fiscal constraints during the next cyclical 
downturn. Moreover, if the robust economy has fostered implementa 
tion of welfare reform, then when the economy turns toward recession 
this interrelationship may become disentangled. To address these
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issues, we use several of the dynamic models from Table 2 to examine 
the responsiveness of recipiency rates to alternative "shocks" to unem 
ployment. We then investigate the extent to which the economy and 
welfare reform are interrelated and the implications of this link in the 
event of a recession. 11
Dynamic Short-Run and Long-Run Simulations
In Table 3 we present both short-run and long-run impacts of alter 
native unemployment rate increases on recipiency rates. Specifically, 
based on the parameter estimates from the dynamic models in Table 2, 
we solve for the long-run, steady-state impact of the unemployment 
rate on recipiency rates. We then simulate the impact of unemploy 
ment rate increases of 1 to 5 percentage points four years into the 
future; these simulations are possibly more reasonable estimates given 
that the long-run steady state is rarely attained. While our preferred 
model in Table 2 is the unweighted, dynamic first-difference column 6, 
we also present simulation results for the weighted and unweighted 
dynamic levels models (from columns 1 and 2, as well as the weighted, 
dynamic first-difference model in column 5).
The first column of Table 3 contains the implied long-run effect of 
a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate on welfare 
recipiency. This effect ranges from 6.26 percent in the weighted, 
dynamic first-difference model to 8.81 percent in the unweighted, 
dynamic levels model. Interestingly, although the short-run effect of 
the unemployment rate on recipiency is higher in the first-differences 
models relative to levels, the levels models imply a larger long-run 
effect because the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is more 
attenuated in levels. Most important, however, the long-run equilib 
rium estimates underscore the importance of controlling for dynamics 
in modeling AFDC recipiency. In the static models of Table 1, the 
short-run and long-run effects coincide. However, the estimates in 
Table 3 reinforce the fact that the static model is a misspecification, 
because the long-run estimates in levels are 2.5 times their static coun 
terparts in Table 1, while the long-run estimates in first differences are 
5-6 times the static estimates.
The remaining five columns in Table 3 present estimates four years 
into the future of increases of various magnitudes in the unemployment
Table 3 Simulated Long-Run and Four-Year Impacts of Alternative Unemployment Rate Increases on Welfare 
Recipient Rates (%)
Implied long-run 
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rate. For example, after four years, the unweighted first-difference 
model predicts that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment 
rate will lead to a 5.9 percent increase in welfare recipients, while a 3- 
percentage-point increase generates a 17.6 percent increase. In these 
simulations, the first-difference models yield a larger effect on recipi 
ents than the levels models. This arises because the first-difference 
models yield larger short-run effects relative to levels, and simulations 
based on a four-year time horizon are dominated by short-run influ 
ences. The simulations suggest that welfare caseloads are quite cycli 
cally sensitive, and that if the economy were to make a substantive turn 
for the worse, many states may experience a surge in welfare recipi 
ents.
Interactions between Welfare Reform and the Macroeconomy
An issue neglected up to this point is the potential role of an inter 
action between welfare reform and the robust economy since 1993 in 
fostering the rapid decline in AFDC caseloads. We address the possi 
bility of interactions between welfare reform and the business cycle in 
the context of the dynamic levels and first-differences models in Eq. 2 
and 3. Specifically, we consider interactions between the "any waiver" 
variable with the contemporaneous unemployment rate and then with 
the full set of current and lagged unemployment rates. If economic 
activity stimulates the caseload reductions associated with welfare 
reforms and if this effect is independent of the "natural" relationship 
between the business cycle and the welfare caseload, the coefficients 
on these interactions will be positive. 12
In Table 4, we present estimates of the interaction between welfare 
reform and the macroeconomy on per capita AFDC recipients in the 
pre-TANF period. For ease of presentation, we suppress the coeffi 
cients on the lagged dependent variable and the current and lagged 
unemployment rates; we present the waiver coefficient along with the 
interactions. In addition, because the partial effect of welfare reform is 
dependent on the level of the unemployment rate, we compute the 
impact of welfare reform after four years in situations with a sustained 
unemployment rate of 2, 4, 6, or 8 percent. Finally, we also present the 
p-value on the (Jomt) significance of the interaction term(s); that is, for 
models with one interaction, the p-value refers to the r-statistic, while
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for models with several interactions the p-value refers to a Wald test of 
the null hypothesis that the interactions are jointly zero.
In the weighted, dynamic levels model column 1, we confirm our 
prior expectation of a positive interacted effect between the macroecon- 
omy and welfare reform. 13 This interaction is highly significant, with a 
p-value of 0.00. The model predicts that after four years, welfare reform 
leads to a 5.6 percent reduction in per capita recipients in states with an 
unemployment rate of 2 percent, while it leads to an increase of 2.8 per 
cent in states with an unemployment rate of 8 percent. Comparable esti 
mates are found in the fully interacted (column 2) as well as in the 
multiple-interaction difference specifications (columns 6 and 8), while 
evidence of a caseload-decreasing effect of welfare reform is less obvi 
ous in the unweighted levels models and the single-interaction first-dif 
ference specifications. Taken as a whole, the estimates in Table 4 
suggest that pre-TANF welfare reform require a robust economy (i.e., 
low unemployment rates) in order to have a negative impact on recipi 
ency rates.
A Lagniappe
While our primary focus in this paper is to provide a reconciliation 
between the CEA and Ziliak et al. estimates of the effect of welfare 
reform and the macroeconomy on per capita AFDC recipients in the 
pre-TANF period, there is much policy interest in understanding the 
sources of caseload declines after passage of PRWORA in August 
1996. A difficulty in applying the model described here to the post- 
TANF period is correctly defining the welfare-reform variable, because 
the reform applies to all states (unlike the pre-TANF waiver programs). 
Nonetheless, one possible strategy is to use the date of waiver approval 
for those states that obtained waivers and to use the date of approval for 
the TANF plan for those states without waivers. We did this, and then 
updated our data to include observations from the 1997 and 1998 fed 
eral fiscal years and re-ran the dynamic levels and first-difference mod 
els in Eq. 2 and 3.
The estimates of the impact of the macroeconomy on recipiency 
rates are nearly identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. For 
instance, the estimated long-run effect of a 1-percentage-point increase 
in the unemployment rate is 6.55 percent in both the weighted and
Table 4 Estimates of the Interaction between Welfare Reform and the Business Cycle on per Capita AFDC 
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Wald test of significance of interactions
P-value____________0.00_____0.00_____0.11_____0.08______0.62_____OOP_____0.96_____0.00 
a All coefficients are multiplied by 100. Standard errors are in parentheses. The data are annual and pertain to all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia for fiscal years 1976-1996. Each regression controls for 4 lags of per capita recipients, 4 lags of unemployment rates, the 
real maximum benefit guarantee for a family of 3, state-specific fixed effects, state-specific trends, and year dummies. 
b Cols. 1 and 2 = weighted Cols. 5 and 6 = weighted 
Cols. 3 and 4 = unweighted Cols. 7 and 8 = unweighted
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unweighted dynamic differences model. However, the welfare-reform 
variable is uniformly negative in both the levels and differences mod 
els, although the effects are relatively small and statistically insignifi 
cant. These updated estimates are suggestive, though, that welfare 
reform has played a larger independent role on the decline in recipi 
ency rates in the post-PRWORA period. The finding of an enhanced 
welfare reform effect in the post-PRWORA period is fully expected, as 
our prior, stated in Ziliak et al. (1997), is that welfare reform should 
take more time to affect caseloads than the period covered in the CEA, 
Blank, and Ziliak et al. studies.
CONCLUSION
Our reconciliation with the previous caseload literature suggests 
that the differing conclusions emanate largely from the treatment of 
dynamics. These dynamics surface in the form of nonstationarities in 
caseloads, sluggish adjustment of current caseloads to past caseloads, 
and lags in the response of caseloads to changes in unemployment 
rates. The primary consequence of controlling for caseload dynamics 
is to reduce the role of welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in 
generating the decline in AFDC caseloads. Our preferred specifica 
tion, an unweighted, dynamic first-difference model, predicts that the 
macroeconomy accounted for about 75 percent of the 1993-1996 
decline in recipiency rates, while the effect of welfare reform was neg 
ligible. We find that the implied long-run effect of a 1-percentage- 
point increase in the unemployment rate is 2.5 to 6 times the static esti 
mate in levels and first differences. In addition, we find that recipiency 
rates (caseloads) are quite cyclically sensitive: a 2-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate leads to an 11.7 percent increase in 
welfare recipiency after four years, while a 4-percentage-point increase 
yields a 23.4 percent increase in recipiency.
Further underscoring the important role that the macroeconomy 
plays in determining caseloads, the analysis suggests that welfare 
reform efforts have been greatly aided by the simultaneous presence of 
a robust economy. Bishop (1998) presented evidence that most of the 
increase in labor force participation rates since 1994 are among single
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women with children. If a large share of these women are former wel 
fare recipients, then the results here suggest that the movement from 
welfare to work would be much weaker in a sluggish economy. How 
ever, even in the presence of economic growth, many welfare recipi 
ents may face substantial personal barriers to employment (Danziger et 
al. 1998).
This raises the broader task of delineating the goals of welfare 
reform. Reducing the caseload may be worthy in its own right if one's 
objective is to reduce the size of government spending, and the results 
here present evidence on the influence of the macroeconomy and wel 
fare reform in achieving that goal. However, if the objective is to 
reduce poverty, then the results of this study do not directly speak to 
the outcomes of former welfare recipients. Unfortunately, many states 
are not following their former welfare cases; thus, a better understand 
ing of welfare reform is incumbent upon correcting this deficiency.
Notes
We thank our discussant, Robert Moffitt, Sheldon Danziger, Greg Duncan, and 
Joe Stone for extensive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. In addition, 
we are grateful to Jeffrey Russell for excellent research assistance, to Gilbert Grouse at 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for providing us with the national 
caseload data, and to Phil Levine for providing the data used in the Council of Eco 
nomic Adviser's report. Financial support from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Joint Center for Poverty Research is gratefully acknowledged. 
All remaining errors are our own. Address correspondence to: James P. Ziliak, Depart 
ment of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285; phone, 
(541) 346-4681; fax, (541) 346-1243; e-mail, jzihak@oregon.uoregon.edu.
1. For reasons discussed below, the replication of the CEA actually focuses on their 
specification 2 of Table 2, which predicts a 31 percent share of the decline to the 
business cycle and a 15 percent share to welfare reform.
2. To a lesser extent we reconcile the results with Blank (1998) as well. Blank 
focused primarily on the 1990-1993 run-up in caseloads and argued that the econ 
omy does not explain this unexpected run-up. Instead, she attributed the increase 
to a rise in child-only cases, an increase in take-up rates, and a long-term, yet 
unexplained, increase in eligibility.
3. See Peskin, Tapogna, and Marcotte (1993) for a complete list of these studies.
4. The Basic program, which comprises about 95 percent of total cases, consists of 
single parents (mainly women) and their children. The UP program permits both 
parents to be present, although the primary income earner must be under fiscal
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stress, e.g., must work less than 100 hours in a month. The UP program was 
available only in about one-half of the states prior to the Family Support Act of 
1988, which mandated all states to offer the program by 1990. However, HHS 
stopped making the distinction between the Basic and UP programs as of June 
1997 because many states only maintain a single program under PRWORA.
5. The estimated welfare-waiver coefficient differs slightly from that reported in the 
CEA. The discrepancy arises from a miscoded waiver for West Virginia in the 
original CEA data, as noted in Levine and Whitmore (1998). The different coeffi 
cients, coupled with a slightly different weighting scheme, results in our simula 
tions yielding a bit more of the share of the 1993-1996 decline to welfare reform 
than did the CEA.
6. Blank (1997) differed from the CEA and Ziliak et al by conducting her analysis 
for the Basic and UP programs separately. The estimates reported here are very 
similar to those reported by Blank for the Basic program, but the UP program is 
much more cyclically sensitive. This suggests that examining total recipients is 
not misleading if one is interested in movements in the largest segment of the pro 
gram or in forecasting aggregate recipients in general.
7. Importantly, though, Ziliak et al actually attributed a larger share to the economy 
and a smaller share to welfare reform. This is partly due to their use of monthly 
data, which picks up high-frequency movements in the business cycle, and from 
the use of a dynamic model as described below.
8. In results not tabulated, we estimated column 7 without weighting the regression 
model and found the business cycle to have a small, but positive, share of the 
1993-1996 decline in recipients.
9. The estimates in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are only meant to be suggestive, because 
the relatively short time horizon may make the coefficients of the lagged depen 
dent variables susceptible to the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell 1981), that is, the 
bias (toward zero) in the lagged dependent variable that arises from the correla 
tion between the lagged dependent variable and the model's error term. Ziliak et 
al. argued that this bias is negligible in their sample of monthly data since T = 
120; however, the annualized version of the Ziliak et al. sample in Table 2 only 
has T= 10. The CEA sample, however, has T= 21 and thus again the Nickell bias 
is likely to be of smaller concern. The latter seems verified in that the results in 
columns 5 and 6 are quite similar to the results in Ziliak et al.
10. One further difference between Ziliak et al. and the CEA is that Ziliak et al. intro 
duced a "time since waiver approval" variable We examined a comparable speci 
fication in the context of the annual models here without any substantive change 
in the conclusions. If anything, the share attributable to welfare reform was more 
negative.
11. There might be some concern that with passage of PRWORA in August 1996, a 
structural change took place in the relationship between unemployment rates and 
welfare caseloads. If so, then out-of-sample forecasts based on pre-PRWORA 
data might be unreliable. We investigated this possibility in the context of a 
dynamic model of AFDC caseloads using state-level monthly data through March
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1998. We interacted the five lags of the unemployment rate with a dummy vari 
able that equaled 1 for any month after September 1996 (the sample began in 
October 1980) and could not reject the null hypothesis of no change in the unem 
ployment rate coefficients after PRWORA. Hence, this suggests that there was no 
structural change in the relationship between unemployment rates and welfare 
caseloads.
12. It might be the case that tests of complementarities between the business cycle 
and welfare reform are better conducted within a state, as opposed to among 
states. The reason for this would be that within-state analyses offer a more natural 
experiment—the welfare reform policy should be relatively uniform within states 
(rather than among states) and other contemporaneous political and social factors 
are more likely to be constant within a state. This suggests that the tests con 
ducted here are likely biased against finding complementarities.
13. Levine and Whitmore (1997) found a statistically insignificant impact on the 
interacted term in their static model. We confirmed their result, but we also found 
that the interaction was strongly statistically significant without weights. This 
again underscores the likely misspecification of a static model.
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